Fields, Power and Social Skill: A Critical Analysis of the New Institutionalisms by Fligstein, Neil
  
International Public Management Review - electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 9  Issue 1  2008  © International Public Management Network 
227 
 
FIELDS, POWER, AND SOCIAL SKILL: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISMS∗  
Neil Fligstein 
ABSTRACT 
"New Institutional" Theories have proliferated across the social sciences. While they 
have substantial disagreements, they agree that institutions are created to produce local 
social orders, are social constructions, fundamentally about how powerful groups 
create rules of interaction and maintain unequal resource distributions, and yet, once in 
existence, both constrain and enable actors in subsequent institution building. I present 
a critique of these theories that focuses on their inadequate attention to the role of 
social power and actors in the creation of institutions. An alternative view of the 
dynamics of institutions is sketched out based on a more sociological conception of 
rules, resources, and social skill.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been increased interest for almost 20 years across the social sciences in 
explaining how social institutions (defined as rules that produce social interaction) come 
into existence, remain stable, and are transformed (for some examples, see in political 
science, March and Olsen, 1989; Steinmo, et. al., 1992; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; 
Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle, 1989; in sociology, Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; 
Scott and Meyer, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 1990; Dobbin, 1994; 
and in economics, Simon, 1957; Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1974; Arthur, 1988).1  
There is substantial disagreement both within and across disciplines over almost all 
facets of this problem. Scholars disagree about what is meant by institutions. Some see 
them as consciously constructed rules or laws, others as norms (i.e. collectively held 
informal rules that are enforced by group sanctions), and still others, as taken for 
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granted meanings (Scott, 1995, ch. 3). Not surprisingly, there is also substantial 
disagreement about how institutions are produced and reproduced.    
In spite of these differences, the authors of the various "new institutionalisms" have 
become aware of one another, what might be called the institutionalization of the "new 
institutionalisms". Hall and Taylor (1994) argue that there are at four forms of new 
institutionalisms, what they label historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism, economic institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. Within 
sociology, the theoretical divisions among scholars (see for instance, the essays in 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) is substantial. These gaps exist in political science and 
economics and the number of new institutionalisms might be much higher.         
Given this lack of agreement, one could suggest that it is foolhardy to propose that we 
are at a point where a dialogue oriented towards a critical understanding of similarities 
and differences is possible. I am motivated to begin this task simply because scholars 
from different disciplines starting from very different points of view, have come to view 
one another as trying to solve similar problems. 
I believe that this reflects four deeply held, but unstated agreements. First, all new 
institutional theories concern the construction of local social orders, what could be 
called "fields", "arenas", or "games". Second, new institutionalisms are social 
constructionist in the sense that they view the creation of institutions as an outcome of 
social interaction between actors confronting one another in fields or arenas. Third, 
preexisting rules of interaction and resource distributions, operate as sources of power, 
and when combined with a model of actors, serve as the basis by which institutions are 
constructed and reproduced. Finally, once in existence, institutions both enable and 
constrain social actors. Privileged actors can use institutions to reproduce their position. 
All actors can use existing institutions to found new arenas. Actors without resources 
are most often constrained by institutions, but under certain circumstances, can use 
existing rules in unintended ways and create new institutions.     
These commonalities exist, I argue, because scholars have inadvertently returned to how 
modern social philosophy first characterized actors and interaction in opposition to the 
old regimes in western Europe. The central ideas of the philosophy of "individualism" 
have generated social technologies that actors have become aware of, use to create 
identities for themselves, organize collectively, and under certain conditions, produce 
new institutions. Social philosophy, since Locke, creates moral arguments about how to 
construct a "just" and "fair" society given that individuals are actors. Institutions are 
social constructions that should be constituted to facilitate a "just and fair" society that 
allows actors to attain "ends".  
Social science accepted the task of social philosophy by focussing on how society 
should work. But, instead of focussing on moral questions, social science has tried to 
provide theoretical tools for social actors to engage in a practical analysis of their 
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situations and thus, arrive at what their options were in different social, political, and 
economic situations.2  
The new institutionalisms began as narrowly framed  oppositional responses to their 
field or subfield attempts to theorize about particular social institutions.
3
  By 
questioning the mechanisms by which social rules are created in specific empirical 
contexts, the narrow critiques became broader. New institutionalists became critics of 
the dominant conception of actors and social structures in their fields. Their main 
insight was in understanding that generic social processes existed to make sense of how 
rules guiding interaction in arenas or fields are formed and transformed. This is why 
scholars from disparate fields are intrigued about the other new institutionalisms. They 
are startled by the fact that other scholars have re-opened the same sets of questions: 
how and why are local social orders produced and what role do actors play in this?  
 
OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT 
Institutions are rules and shared meanings (implying that people are aware of them or 
that they can be consciously known) that define social relationships, help define who 
occupies what position in those relationships, and guide interaction by giving actors' 
cognitive frames or sets of meanings to interpret the behavior of others. They are 
intersubjective (i.e. can be recognized by others), cognitive, (i.e. depend on actors' 
cognitive abilities), and to some degree, require self reflection by actors (see Scott, 
1995, ch. 3, for a good review of the various bases of institutions). Institutions can, of 
course, affect the situations of actors with or without their consent or understanding. 
New institutional theories agree about how to think about the context of interaction that 
produces and reproduces institutions. The major source of disagreement stems from 
how theorists think about actors. I critique both sociological and rational actor models 
for lacking insight into how action works and then, propose a sociological model that is 
consistent with symbolic interactionism. This helps solve a number of the problems 
generated using traditional models of actors in new institutional theories. From the point 
of view of exposition, it is useful to lay out my argument before considering the 
theories.   
The central agreement across theories focuses on the concept of fields, which can be 
labeled "fields" (Bourdieu, 1977), "organizational fields" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
"sectors" (Meyer and Scott, 1983), "strategic action fields" (Fligstein and McAdam, 
                                                 
2 All  social science theories try to analyze what "is" in order to suggest what "might" or "ought" to be. 
For some social scientists, rational social policy can be made using these analyses by governments. For 
others, analyses are meant to inform social movements about how their ends can be attained. 
3 The "new institutionalisms" began in different subfields across disciplines: in political science, the study 
of American politics, international relations, the history of the modern state, and comparative politics; in 
economics, the study of economic history, technological change, and the study of industrial structure 
including, market structure, law, and firm organization; in sociology, the study of organizations, politics, 
and social movements. 
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1994), or "games" (Axelrod, 1984). In economics, fields are consistent with current 
views of industrial organization (Gibbons, 1992). Fields refer to situations where 
organized groups of actors gather and frame their actions vis a vis one another. New 
institutional theories concern how fields of action come into existence, remain stable, 
and can be transformed. The production of rules in a social arena is about creating 
institutions.4 Institutionalization is the process by which rules move from abstractions to 
being constitutive of repeated patterns of interaction in fields (Jepperson, 1991).5
 
 
Why do actors want to produce stable patterns of interaction?  My position is that the 
process of institution building takes place in the context of powerful actors attempting 
to produce rules of interaction to stabilize their situation vis a vis other powerful and 
less powerful actors. Fields operate to help reproduce the power and privilege of 
incumbent groups and define the positions of challengers.6 While incumbent groups 
benefit the most from fields, challenger groups gain some stability by surviving, albeit 
at a lower level of resources.7 
Institution building moments occur when groups of social actors confront one another in 
some set of social interactions that are contentious. These moments are inherently 
political and concern struggles over scarce resources by groups with differing amounts 
of power. Another way to put this, is that institution building moments proceed from 
crises of existing groups (or in the language of game theory, suboptimal arrangements) 
either in their attempts to produce stable interactions or when their current rules no 
longer serve their purposes. 
There are a number of ways stable institutions can be built. Some groups come to 
dominate and impose a set of rules and relations on other groups. An outside force, such 
as a government, can enforce order and privilege itself or its most favored groups. 
Sometimes groups can produce a political coalition to bargain an outcome that provides 
                                                 
4 States contain the fields in modern societies where general rules are hammered out and enforced. Fields 
outside of states become organized according to general rules in society and local rules that come from 
the interaction of groups in those fields. 
5 This is an important distinction. Laws can intentionally or unintentionally create new fields. Practices 
can be borrowed from other fields. Either of these preexisting institutions can be used by actors to frame 
interactions. This process of institutionalization is separate from and even somewhat orthogonal to the 
original production of the laws or practices. As actors interact, they may end up structuring a field that 
was unintended by the original institution builders. 
6 Incumbents refer to the dominant groups in a field while challengers refers to outsider groups. This 
language was used by Gamson (1974) to describe social movement organizations.    
7 There are two sources of ambiguity here. People are not always aware that a field is about power. They 
may deem their institutions "natural" and resist a power interpretation even if it is obvious to an outside 
observer. Moreover, modern cognitive psychology tells us that the human mind imposes order and reason 
on situations even where there is not necessarily any. So, while the game played in any field will be 
structured around the power relations between groups, the game played in any arena cannot simply be 
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rules for those groups. If a situation is sufficiently fluid and large numbers of groups 
begin to appear, it is possible for skilled social actors to help groups overcome their 
differences by proposing a new identity for the field. It is important to recognize that 
institution building may fail: disparate interests and identities of groups can prevent 
stable institutions from emerging.  
One of the great insights of the "new institutionalisms" is that the uneasy relationships 
between challenger and incumbent groups, the struggle between incumbent groups 
within and across fields to set up and maintain fields, and the intended and unintended 
spillovers caused by these struggles into adjacent fields, are the source of much of the 
dynamics of modern society. These struggles can be thought of as "games"; i.e. social 
interactions oriented towards producing outcomes for each group. The possibility for 
new fields turns on actors using existing understandings to create new fields. Their 
impetus to do so, is frequently based on their current situation either as challengers or 
dominators. In modernity, the possibility of improving a group's collective situation can 
cause an invasion of a nearby field or the attempt to create a new one. 
The problem of constructing fields turns on using "culture" in three ways. First, 
preexisting societal practices that include laws, definitions of relevant resources and 
rules, and the ability of actors to draw on organizing technologies (for example, 
technologies that create various kinds of formal organizations) influence field 
construction. Second, the rules of each field are unique and are embedded in the power 
relations between groups; they function as "local knowledge" (Geertz, 1983). Finally, 
actors have cognitive structures that utilize cultural frames, akin to what Bourdieu 
(1977) calls "habitus", to analyze the meanings of the actions of others. These frames 
help actors decide "what is going on" and what courses of action are available to them 
as interactions proceed.      
Once in place, fields and the social positions they define constrain actions and choice 
sets of actors. But this does not mean that the meanings and pecking orders of fields are 
uncontested. Indeed, action in stable fields is a game where actors are constituted with 
resources and the rules are set. In the interactions of more and less powerful, the game 
for the more powerful is to reproduce the order. 
The modern economy, state, formal organization, and social movements are both the 
outcome and cause of the organizing technology we call "fields". I will try and convince 
readers of this by reconsidering how the institutions of modern society depended on, 
were created by, and generated, self-aware actors who theorized this conception of 
actors and social interaction. It is the discovery (or rediscovery) of this theory of fields 
which brings scholars who have studied markets, states, political processes, and formal 
organizations to eye one another in their pursuit of a general theory of institutions.   
New institutional theories imply questioning conventional conceptions of actors by 
focusing on how collective social actors orient action towards one another. Actors may 
be purposeful, but those purposes must be constructed in the context of their collective 
situations. These actors have to pay attention to other collective actors, interpret their 
intentions, frame their subsequent actions, and convince others to go along.  
Ironically, the opportunity to rethink how actors are constituted has not progressed very 
far in any version of the "new" institutionalisms. There are two standard approaches, 
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both of which reinforce the older approaches to institutions. Rational actor models stress 
how actors have unitary goals, know their  position in the structure of relationships, and 
have some information as to what others are doing. This allows them to engage in what 
game theory calls "strategic action" (Gibbons, 1992). The more sociological versions 
accept that actors are collective and embedded in social relations and these relations 
determine the available cultural scripts. Actors have no alternative but to follow the 
scripts which could reflect their interests, values, roles, or norms.  
What is missing from these theories is a real sociological conception of action. Rational 
choice models of strategic action are correct in focusing our attention on the strategic 
behavior of actors. But, they do not take seriously the problem of how actors are 
socially situated in a group and how their strategic actions are framed by the problems 
of attaining cooperation. One's own group has heterogeneous conceptions of identity 
(i.e. who they are and what they want) and interests that have to be balanced in order to 
attain cooperation. Making sense of the behavior of other groups becomes ambiguous as 
the meaning of their actions is less easy to decipher for the same reason. The framing of 
a response requires careful cultural construction that must frame the meaning of others' 
action in a way that will mobilize one's own group. Sociological institutionalisms don't 
do much better at this problem. They focus heavily on scripts and the structural 
determination of action and have little insight into exactly how actors "get" action.      
I pose that the idea that strategic action occurs in fields requires the notion of social 
skill, defined as the ability of actors to induce cooperation in other actors in order to 
produce, contest, or reproduce a given set of rules (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein and 
McAdam, 1994; Joas, 1996). The skill required to induce cooperation is to 
imaginatively identify with the mental states of others in order to find collective 
meanings that motivate other actors. Social skill entails utilizing a set of methods to 
induce cooperation from one's own group and other groups (Fligstein, 1997). Skilled 
social actors interpret the actions of others in the field, and on the basis of the position 
of their group, use their perception of current opportunities or constraints, to attain 
cooperation.  
The rest of this paper is oriented towards demonstrating that the new institutionalisms 
view fields as interactions between more and less powerful collective groups according 
to  rules and shared meanings. My key insight is that the critical problem for all of the 
theories is developing a more social, collective conception of action that gives rise to a 
better understanding of what actors do, if institutions are to be produced or reproduced. 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF ACTORS IN MODERNITY  
Hirschman (1997) has argued persuasively that much of how we think about actors in 
modernity can be captured by examining how the conception of human nature in social 
and political philosophy changed from Hobbes to Locke. Hobbes' view of action was 
that people acted for irrational reasons, their "passions". But by the late 17th century, 
this view of human nature had changed and was replaced by a Lockean view where 
actors were conceived as being driven by interest, and oriented to gaining advantage by 
deploying self-conscious means to attain ends.   
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Hobbes and Locke wanted to use their conception of human action to justify how 
economies and governments could be legitimate.8
 
 For Hobbes (1991), the irrational 
character of humans implied that an absolute monarch should exist to keep people from 
producing the "war of all against all". For Locke (1988), the proper role of government 
was to try and solve the complex problem of balancing off people's very different 
interests, while not being over restrictive of people's natural right to pursue those 
interests. Locke was interested in defending the rights of property against unjust 
incursion from governments or other organized actors. 
This debate was generated by the upheavals in the world of politics and commerce as 
they were being played out in England. The theory of the individual in modernity 
produced three insights: humans could all be actors (individuals with interests who 
could undertake rational action to attain their ends), actors could collectively decide to 
make rules to govern their interactions (produce institutions), and governments were 
organizations that helped make and enforce these rules. But who actually got to be an 
actor, what kind of rules could be made and enforced, and who got to have a say in 
government has been the continuous source of conflict. As a result, societies produced 
wide variations in institutions and arrangements.9    
Privileged groups used early modern states to assert that they were the only people who 
were actors or citizens (Sewell, 1994). But the issue of who was an actor and a citizen, 
and what rights they could claim had been opened up by the discourse of individualism 
and the apparent malleability of institutional arrangements. The idea that everyone was 
an actor and a citizen became an ideological rallying cry for those who were 
dispossessed. These groups, particularly the organized working class, fought bloody 
battles to expand citizenship rights and change the nature of the state and economy 
(Bendix, 1954). 
The modern state and its politics, the modern economy, and the modern conceptions of 
organization and power that organized these larger orders, are intimately related to who 
gets to be a rational actor (i.e. an actor with "ends"). Social movements were able to 
change who got to be an actor and what they "rights" were. Social movements are 
usually defined as politics outside of normal channels (Tarrow, 1994).10 Groups in social 
                                                 
8 This can be read as how institutions should be constructed. 
9 Most of social philosophy sought to downplay the malleability of institutions and instead tried to ground 
them in human nature. While some have been oriented towards liberating people, much of social 
philosophy was oriented towards a justification of the status quo. This meant "naturalizing" what existed 
in order to defend the status quo. 
10 Both political science and sociology have separated the study of social movements from political 
sociology. This separation makes little sense. Social movements are trying to open up new fields of action 
that could transform governments and organized politics. Empirically, it is odd to exclude the politics of 
those trying to organize new fields from our analyses of politics in society in general. If one is trying to 
make sense of established politics, it seems ludicrous to declare how those politics got established as "not 
interesting". Theoretically, social movements reflect politics in unorganized fields. Studying them will 
certainly inform us about some of the generic social processes in the formation of fields. 
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movements were outsiders because what they sought, was to create a society where they 
were actors and where governments were forced to be reconstituted to attend to their 
interests. Where groups sought revolutionary change, the goal was to produce a "state" 
where all had rights that the current regime denied them.  
This does not mean that all people are or ever were equally constituted as actors.11 
Indeed, as people struggled to get recognized as actors, dominant groups continuously 
found new ways to change that definition. Laws and existing distributions of resources, 
and even the ability to define what resources are important for privileges, has meant that 
privileged groups have everywhere been successful at defending their positions 
(Bourdieu, 1988). These struggles are reflected in the institutions, organizations, and 
governments of the U.S. and western Europe, and they go on today.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORIES    
The social science disciplines were trying to make sense of how people, now constituted 
as being able to act and affect their life chances, actually could, or in the case of 
sociology, could not, do so. Social science accepted the premise of the philosophic 
discourse of modernity that focused on actors and the pliability of institutions and 
attempted to produce theories that could be applied to some situation, and then, used to 
change the world.12     
This required turning the ideological assertion that everyone was an actor into a 
theoretical model whereby this insight could be used to analyze and predict what was 
going on in given situations.  One way to make sense of how disciplines proceeded, is 
to characterize the issue as the problem of structures and actors (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 
1992). The general theoretical issue concerns the degree to which actors' choices given 
their resources, the rules that define what they can do, and the position they occupy in a 
given social interaction, are structured. Sociological and many political science 
perspectives emphasized that people's positions in structures highly determined what 
they thought, what their interests were, and how they would act in a given situation. 
These theories gave priority to structural analyses in determining what might or might 
not occur in a given situation.   
                                                 
11 It also does not mean that every western society converges to a single set of institutions. The real 
economic and political histories of these societies have produced different compromises between political 
coalitions thereby producing different sets of "rules".  
12 In economics, theory is used to produce "positive" results about how organizing some part of the 
economy a certain way might turn out, and these results have "normative" implications for the efficient 
allocation of scarce societal resources. Some sociologists have been interested in using theory and 
empirical study to characterize social problems and propose social policies to ameliorate them. Others 
have been more interested in radical social change and providing analysis for social movements. Political 
scientists want to use theory to frame policy options and debates. 
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The alternative view, developed in economics, is that while resources and rules produce 
constraints, they also produce opportunities. This view emphasizes that actors make 
choices and that they act to produce the most positive outcomes for themselves. Actors 
enter situations, consider their resources, their preferences, and then select actions 
oriented towards maximizing their preferences.  Actors' behaviors are predictable in 
several ways. If actors face similar constraints, one would expect them to behave in a 
similar way. Differences in outcomes could only result from different initial resource 
endowments, or holding endowments constants, different preferences. Economics and 
political science, and to a lesser degree, sociology, have used this perspective.  
Traditionally, the issue of whether or not choices exist, has been used rhetorically to 
define the theoretical terrains of the disciplines with sociology focusing on how actors 
do not have choices, political science using both approaches, and economics heavily 
focused on choices. But the theory of action in all of the disciplines is relatively 
structural. The neoclassical economic view of profit maximizing actors with fixed 
preferences implies that people in similar social situations will behave the same, 
suggesting that their position in structure is the main determinant of action. The actors 
in traditional political science or sociological theories were either acting in their 
"interests" as in pluralist or Marxist theories (consistent with the economic view), or 
according to their values and norms in Parsonian or Durkheimian theory. If "self 
interest" is the value or norm operative in a given situation, then it becomes hard to tell 
the difference between economic and sociological models.  
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISMS IN CONTEXT 
What brings the "new institutionalisms" together is their questioning of what structures 
are and where they come from, and the role of actors in the production of structures. 
The theories start by replacing structures as abstract positions with the idea of structures 
as arenas of action which are defined by rules and groups with different resources 
oriented towards one another. 
Neoclassical economics made a great deal of progress by ignoring institutions and 
organizations in their analyses of markets and focused instead on understanding how 
profit maximizing actors with fixed preferences and perfect information could produce 
an optimal allocation of societal resources through market exchange. Markets with these 
social conditions produced optimal outcomes. Violations of the assumptions of this 
model implied suboptimal outcomes; i.e. market failure.  
Scholars began to notice two things: the assumptions of the neoclassical model were 
always being violated to some degree and organizations and rules were everywhere. 
This led scholars to begin to think that organizations and rules (i.e. institutions) might 
serve to overcome market failure.13  The field where much of this ferment began was 
industrial organization. Neoclassical theory had until the 1950s by and large, ignored 
                                                 
13 This, of course, is the insight that rational choice theorists in political science took from economics. 
Given a world of rational actors with fixed preferences, attaining ends would depend on perfect 
information and finding optimal collective solutions to problems. Political rules and organizations, thus, 
had to overcome the war of all against all, by powerfully locking actors into procedures whereby 
agreement was possible.   
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the most common organization in capitalism, the firm, and instead focused on how price 
theory explained market structure (Stigler, 1968).  
Simon (1957) pioneered the attempt to account for why rules and organizations existed 
by questioning the model of action that lay beneath neoclassical economics. His critique 
focused on two problems. First, people could not be profit maximizers because their 
cognitive limitations implied that they could not process all relevant information even if 
they had it, which they frequently did not. Second, if actors were self interested, it was 
clear that they had incentive to pursue goals inconsistent with profit maximization of 
employers.  
Simon's genius was in using this modified model of action to account for the ubiquity of 
firms and rules. Instead of being inefficient drags on market processes, Simon realized 
that they helped solve the problems of bounded rationality and self interested behavior 
(1957; March and Simon, 1958). While owners might want to organize to attain the 
highest profits, those lower down in the organization would be more likely to pursue 
other goals. Moreover, because of bounded rationality, it would be difficult to monitor 
all levels of the firm, even assuming that people had bought into the overall goals of the 
firm.   
Organizational structure and design, therefore, had to occur in order to mitigate the 
potentially negative effects of both of these problems. For managers, this meant 
producing subgoals for different parts of the organization in order to be able to evaluate 
if those goals were being attained. To control workers, this involved having well 
defined tasks, routine procedures, and easy rules of thumb to aid decision-making. Since 
neither workers nor managers could follow everything that was going on, the 
organization had to be set up so that higher level managers could respond to transparent 
signals that might indicate trouble.   
There are a number of streams of thought that are related to this ferment: transaction 
cost analysis, agency theory, and North's early work on historical economics which tied 
the production of political and economic institutions to the dominance of the market 
(North and Thomas, 1973). The basic insight of these approaches was to consider that 
the ubiquity of social organization and rules must be understood as somehow efficiency 
generating and by implication as a response to market failure. Firms, networks, supplier 
chains, institutional rules, and ownership forms could all be reliably argued to play 
efficiency generating functions that explained their domination and variation within 
capitalist economies (Schotter, 1981; Williamson, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 1983 a; b).   
Game theory was first used to attempt to explain how organizational decision makers 
framed their actions towards their competitors. It was not intended to overthrow 
neoclassical theory. Instead, it tried to reason about how the structure of the market 
would affect the strategic actions of firms and could produce stable and optimal 
outcomes (i.e. joint benefits) for actors under different conditions of information, 
numbers of players, and the number of iterations of interactions (Gibbons, 1992; 
Axelrod, 1984).  
Economists and political scientists realized that game theoretic arguments could apply 
to anywhere actors engaged in strategic action (Axelrod, 1984). The problem was to 
understand the nature of joint decision-making in a given situation sufficiently well, as 
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to be able to produce a plausible "game". Game theory does not suggest that equilibrium 
will always be found, but can be used to demonstrate that decision traps can decisively 
prevent cooperation and produce suboptimal outcomes (Scharpf, 1988).    
The issue of the efficiency of institutional arrangements is one of the frontiers of new 
institutional theory. If new institutional theory began with the idea that institutions 
could be efficient, it could also lead to the conclusion that current arrangements might 
be suboptimal. Game theory is a tool that suggests why that might be.  
North (1990) and Arthur (1988; 1991) propose an even more radical view of 
institutions: political or economic institutions may occur accidentally or be orthogonal 
with respect to producing efficient outcomes. So, for example, ownership forms may 
have been produced, not to maximize efficiency as agency theorists suggest (Jensen and 
Fama, 1980a; b), but by historical accident (Roe, 1994). Arthur (1991) argues that 
technologies that were not optimal could become dominant because of the production of 
a set of organizations, practices, and rules that supported the technology. He also 
suggests (1988) that the geographic location of firms might result as much from 
historical accident as efficiency considerations. Once in place, the sunk costs of these 
arrangements make them prohibitively expensive to change. This process has become 
characterized as path dependence.   
Two versions of new institutionalisms have emerged from political science: historical 
institutionalism, which began mainly in the field of comparative politics, and rational 
choice allied with game theory, which began in American politics and  international 
relations. Both versions started out trying to understand how the rules and organization 
of governments shaped the outputs of government. Their critiques were narrowly aimed 
at their opponents.      
Historical institutionalists were mainly responding to scholars who wanted to reduce 
political processes to group conflict, particularly the effects of social class (Steinmo and 
Thelen, 1992). Scholars who saw politics as reflections of either social classes or 
interest groups, discounted the impact of governments on political outputs. Historical 
institutionalists use a set of heterogeneous arguments to focus on how existing 
governmental institutions define the terrain of politics and circumscribe what is 
possible.  
Existing government organizations have very different capacities for intervention into 
their societies. These organizational capacities and the current definition of political 
crises, structure the opportunities for political action (Evans, Skocpol, and 
Rueschmeyer, 1985). Political traditions and the roles they specify for various actors in 
different societies also shape what kinds of policies make sense (March and Olsen, 
1990). Political parties, ideologies, voting and traditions of political activism affect the 
political behavior of groups. In this way, ideologies of "civic duty" and "civil service" 
can affect people's behavior as well.    
Piersen (1995) has drawn on two types of social metaphors, "unintended consequences" 
and "path dependence" to suggest that political organizations and institutions can and 
frequently do set limits on current political actors' preferences. Lawmakers may set up 
institutions that can get used for purposes for which they were not intended. When a 
new set of lawmakers returns to political problems generated by new arrangements, they 
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must begin with the unintended consequences of previous legislation, as limits on their 
actions. As political institutions are put into place, they develop a certain logic of their 
own. That logic directly shapes the possibility of actors to enact their preferences as 
well.    
Steinmo and Thelen (1994) go even further and argue that, under certain conditions, 
actors' preferences can be endogenous to the process of institution building episodes. 
Put simply, people figure out what they want as events unfold. Political process, thus, 
can matter a great deal. Actors, in these situations may exist who use new ideas to forge 
alliances that reorganize groups' preferences. These actors function as political or 
institutional entrepreneurs. 
Rational choice and game theory perspectives in American politics began by trying to 
understand why political institutions existed at all.14 They account for institutions by 
arguing that rational self-interested actors would constantly face collective actions 
dilemmas where their preferences would never be maximized, because there would 
always be other political actors to block them. Institutions come into existence to help 
solve collective action dilemmas by providing people with more information about the 
strategic actions of others and give them opportunities to make trade-offs, like 
"logrolling" in order that all could gain from exchange (Weingast and Marshall, 1982; 
Shepsle, 1989; Cox and McCubbins, 1987). 
Rational choice game theoretic perspectives have been used extensively in the 
international relations literature where governments are characterized as unitary actors 
with an interest in security who confront one another in a world without rules (Waltz, 
1979). Institutions, rules to guide interactions, would only come into existence where 
the interests of governments converged and even then, agreements would require 
extensive monitoring. The problem with this perspective, was that it made it difficult to 
explain the postwar boom in the production of international organizations that were not 
security oriented. Keohane (1984; 1986) used arguments very similar to those employed 
in American politics to suggest that the ubiquity of international agreements had to 
reflect the increasing interdependence of states in various social and economic arenas 
and the convergence of interests encouraged them to produce intergovernmental 
bargains.          
Both institutionalisms start with the question of how political organizations and 
institutions matter for political outputs. Both agree that politics occurs in political arenas 
where processes follow rules in the context of a given set of organizations. The major 
source of disagreements stems from their differences of opinion about what motivates 
action in the first place and the degree to which institutions shape action. Rational 
choice perspectives focus on how rational actors produce institutions that reflect their 
interests, given fixed preferences and a set of rules, through a gamelike process of 
strategic action. Historical institutionalists are willing to say that actors' interests and 
preferences matter, but argue that this is more dependent on existing organizations, 
                                                 
14 This strategy, of course, intentionally parallels the approach in economics, where the question was, why 
would rational actors create firms? In politics, the question was, why would rational actors create rules 
and organization to do politics? Weingast and Marshall intentionally use this metaphor by entitling their 
paper "The industrial organization of Congress" (1982).   
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institutions, and political opportunities than rational choice theorists would generally 
allow (Piersen, 1995; Evans et. al., 1985). The main disagreement between the 
perspectives, concerns the degree to which preferences could be endogenously 
determined. If preferences are a product of situational social roles or the "current" crisis 
which causes actors to rethink who they are, then rational models are less able to predict 
what might happen.    
In sociology, the new institutionalism began as one of a set of critiques of Simon's 
rational approach to organizations. Simon's approach had become formalized into the 
view that the people who ran organizations could scan their environment, perceive their 
problems and engage in rational organizational redesign to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  
Scholars began to realize that the world external to an organization was a social 
construction (Scott and Meyer, 1991). They began to question whether or not 
environments offered clear signals as to what was going on and if it was possible to 
judge which strategies promoted organizational survival. This meant that "efficiency" 
might be a myth and organizational action was more about appearing to be legitimate 
than undertaking "rational" actions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).    
One important insight was to begin to theorize about organizational fields or sectors, 
defined as arenas of action where organizations took one another into account in their 
actions (Scott and Meyer, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutions were thought 
of as the meanings (both general in society and specific to the context) that structured 
fields and helped guide actors through the muddle around them. They defined who was 
in what position in the field, gave people rules and cognitive structures to interpret 
others' actions, and scripts to follow under conditions of uncertainty (Jepperson, 1991). 
Because of uncertainty, the new institutionalists argue that organizations in fields tend 
to become isomorphic. This occurs through mimicry, coercion, or normative pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Competitors, professionals, suppliers, or customers can 
bring about organizational change. Governments are heavily implicated because they set 
rules for societies as a whole and often force conformity upon organizations (Meyer and 
Scott, 1993; Fligstein, 1996).   
The view of action in sociological versions of the new institutionalism is complex. The 
more structuralist versions of the new institutionalism argue that fields produce few 
choices for actors and instead focus on how taken for granted meanings in 
institutionalized spheres have actors play parts, whether or not they realize it (Jepperson 
and Meyer, 1991; Scott, 1995).   
But a less structuralist position implies that the murkiness of organizational worlds 
means that rationality is a story that actors use after they decide to act (White, 1994). 
Preferences are not fixed, but form through action. Moreover, institutional practices 
might or might not produce advantageous outcomes for their practitioners. This view is 
close to Steinmo and Thelen's argument that preferences might be endogenous.  
There are two other views that might rest somewhere in the middle, what could be 
termed a cultural and a political perspective. The cultural view accepts the argument 
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that social life is murky. Interpretations are available from a number of legitimating 
sources; the professions, governments, and other actors in the field. This produces field 
homogeneity in terms of organizational structures, goals, and the rationales of important 
actors through mimetic processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio (1987) has 
acknowledged the limitations of this approach by agreeing that mimetic behavior could 
account for action in fields that are already constituted. In new fields, he postulates the 
existence of institutional entrepreneurs, visionary leaders who are able to articulate a 
new way to produce successful outcomes.     
Fligstein (1990; 1996) has argued that fields are systems of power whereby incumbent 
actors use a cultural conception, what he calls a "conception of control", to enforce their 
position. The conception of control embedded in a field reflects the rules by which the 
field is structured. It operates as a cognitive frame for actors in incumbent and 
challenger organizations by which they use to make sense of the moves of others. In 
stable fields, conceptions of control are used to interpret and reinforce the existing order 
by incumbent groups. When fields are in the process of being formed, institutional 
entrepreneurs are the people who provide the vision to build political coalitions with 
others to structure a field, and not surprisingly these entrepreneurs and their allies end 
up dominating the field. 
CRITIQUE 
The discussion of institutions by the various new institutionalisms highlights that 
interaction takes place in contexts, what I have called fields. Fields are institutionalized 
arenas of interaction where actors with differing organizational capacities orient their 
behavior towards one another. The rules of the arena shape what is possible by 
providing tools for actors to interact, and are the source for actors to think about what 
their interests are, interpret what other actors do, and, strategically, what they should do.  
New institutional theories agree that such social arrangements are necessary for the 
survival of groups and malleable to the organized actions of actors. They also agree that 
institutions are likely to be path dependent (i.e. constrain subsequent interaction). They 
also agree that a set of existing institutions might get used by actors for new purposes, 
in ways that were unintended by those who created them. This is one way of thinking 
about what we call unintended consequences. Most theories would accept that 
institutions are "sticky". They tend not to change both because the interests of actors are 
embedded in them and institutions are implicated in actors' cognitive frames and habits.    
  
It is obvious that the new institutionalisms disagree on the roles of actors, culture, and 
power. At one extreme, rational choice suggests that institutions are the outcome of 
individual rational actors interacting in gamelike situations where rules are given and 
resources, indexing the relative power of actors, are fixed. At the other, sociological 
institutionalists focus instead on how social worlds are murky, require interpretation, 
and actions may or may not have consequences. Actors in these theories are more 
socially embedded and more collective. But the theory of action is about how local 
cultures and social positions in fields dictate what actors think and do, and not about 
interaction. Many sociological and political science discussions avoid the issue of social 
power entirely. 
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I want to explore these differences of opinion. My purpose is to argue that a more 
adequate theory of institutions (at least for sociologists) depends on developing a better 
link between the sociological notion of fields based on power and a notion of action that 
makes social interaction, core to the theory. The critique of both the sociological and 
rational choice perspectives suggests that neither adequately solves these problems. A 
sociological theory of action needs to take rational actor views seriously. But it must 
"sociologize" them by making actors collective, and motivate their actions by having 
them orient their strategic behavior to groups. It also needs to recognize that fields are 
about power in the sense that fields benefit the dominant players.   
Sociological conceptions of the new institutionalism have the strength of pointing out 
that action occurs in fields where collective social actors gather to orient themselves to 
one another. The goal of institutions, in this case, is to provide collective meanings by 
which the structuring of the field occurs, and actors can come to interpret one another's 
actions in order to reproduce their social groups. Most new institutional analyses in 
sociology have started with institutionalized environments. Once a set of beliefs or 
meanings is shared, this argument suggests that actors both consciously and 
unconsciously spread or reproduce it. Since it is often the case that actors can 
conceptualize no alternatives, they use the existing rationalized myths about their 
situations to structure and justify their actions (DiMaggio, 1987).      
Unfortunately, the theory of action in this model makes actors cultural "dopes" 
(Giddens, 1984) by making them the passive recipients of institutions. Shared meanings 
become the causal force in the argument and actors are the transmitters that diffuse 
those meanings to groups. Meyer and some of his students (Thomas, et. al., 1987) have 
taken this argument to its logical extreme by arguing that the social life in the west can 
be accounted for by the myth of individualism, which produces both social stability and 
change in fields.15   
Most versions of new institutional theory in sociology lack a theory of power as well, 
which is related to the problem of the theory of action. The question of why fields 
should exist and in whose interest they exist, never is a focus of institutional theories. 
Field analysis and dynamics is rarely about power, about who is benefiting, and who is 
not. The theory of action fosters this turn away from issues of power by making actors' 
propagators of shared meanings and followers of scripts. If actors are agents of 
rationalized myths, and therefore lack "interests", one is left wondering, why do they 
act?     
By virtue of its lacking a real theory of interaction and power, most versions of the new 
institutionalism in sociology have no way to make sense of how institutions emerge in 
                                                 
15 I agree with Meyer that modernity is about the construction of the myth of individualism and the 
reconstitution of actors as I argued earlier in the paper. But I believe that this abstract idea is only part of 
the story which can be used to justify a large number of actions and social arrangements. The larger and 
more important part of the story is the development of defining actors, organizing technologies, and their 
subsequent use in state and economy building. Moreover, the purpose of institution building is for sets of 
actors to produce arenas of power where their positions are reproduced.     
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the first place (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; DiMaggio, 1987; Scott, 1995; Colignon, 
1997). Where do the opportunities for these new forms of action come from?; which 
actors can organize?; which meanings are available and which are unavailable and 
why?; why and how do actors who are supposed to only be able to follow scripts 
recognize these situations and create new institutions? 
This also creates problems which run against current social theorizing, both in rational 
choice theory and in recent sociology. The new institutionalist model of action in 
sociology just does not engage the rational choice assertion that people have reasons for 
acting, i.e. they pursue some conception of their interests, and interact vis a vis others to 
attain them. Most rational choice theorists who are confronted by this sociological 
version of institutions respond by being puzzled. Social scientists that are looking for an 
alternative to rational choice, are usually frustrated by this form of sociological 
institutionalism because they want a creative role for actors, but not one with the stark 
assumptions and world view of rational choice models.  
Theoretical discussions in sociology in the past 15 years imply that the production and 
reproduction of current sets of rules and distributions of resources depends on the 
skilled performances of actors who use their social power and knowledgeability to act 
for themselves and against others (Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Sewell, 1992). Actors, under both stable and unstable institutional 
conditions, are not just captured by shared meanings in their fields, understood either as 
scripts as they might be interpreted by professionals or government bureaucrats. Instead, 
they operate with a certain amount of social skill to reproduce or contest systems of 
power and privilege. They do so as active members of a field whose lives are wrapped 
up and dependent on fields.   
Rational choice theories in economics and political science are strong at pointing out 
how actors come together, what their motives are, and how and why they produce 
institutions. Institutions are defined as social organizational vehicles that help actors 
attain interests when markets, in the case of economics, or current laws or rules, in the 
case of political science, fail to do so. The theory provides predictions on the likelihood 
of some set of outcomes given the current interests of actors and the existing 
constitution of interests and rules.  
It helps explain how social life is socially constructed, but along potentially explicable 
lines. Self interested actors have incentives to innovate and their success is often 
quickly emulated by others. Institutions depend on actors finding joint solutions to their 
problems of interaction. They may fail in this effort and construct institutions that have 
perverse or suboptimal outcomes.  
But, rational choice and game theory models have problematic theories of power and 
action as well. Because actors are conceptualized as individuals, even when they 
represent collectivities, the nature of social arenas and the role of actors in producing, 
maintaining, and having positions in that arena, are under theorized. States, political 
processes in general, and power are considered to be rules and resources. These form 
background under which rational actors play out their games.   
The basic problem is that these theories miss the point that actors (decision makers, 
managers, leaders, or elites) have many constituencies to balance off and they must 
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continuously be aware that they have to produce arrangements to induce cooperation 
with both their allies and opponents. So, for example, actors in challenger groups have 
to keep their groups together and continue to motivate them to cooperate. Put simply, 
social life is inherently political. Rational actor models, by treating rules and resources 
as exogenous, and actors as individuals with preferences, miss the creativity and skill 
required for individuals, as representatives of collectivities, to operate politically vis a 
vis other actors to produce, reproduce, and transform institutional arrangements.   
This problem of rational choice accounts is what gives them their teleological feel; i.e. 
the outcomes that occurred were the only possible ones. Non rational choice oriented 
political scientists and sociologists are frequently frustrated by the fact that rational 
choice models are uninterested in the details of the historical social processes by which 
arrangements are made. What they do not recognize, is that this lack of interest stems 
from the model of action. Once the existing rules and resources are known, actors' 
interests and thus their actions follow. The real negotiation within groups and across 
them and its effects on the constitution of interests are ruled out a priori as possibly 
being consequential for the outcome. 
 
SOCIAL SKILL AND THE RUDIMENTS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
My purpose in the next two sections is to sketch out a particularly sociological view of 
institutions that can be constructed from the review and critique. I begin thinking about 
how these concepts help make sense of the dynamics of states and fields in 
contemporary societies. Of course, this account is meant to be suggestive and 
provocative, and not exhaustive.   
A "stable" field of action can be characterized as one where the groups and their social 
positions are reproduced from period to period by skilled social actors who use a set of 
understandings about who is an actor, interpret what other actors mean by their actions, 
and what actions make sense in order to preserve the status quo.  The reproduction of 
the field not only depends on reading the "other", but inducing cooperation in one's one 
group by convincing them of that interpretation. A field is a "game" that depends on 
actors, culture, and power. This generic view of fields is not just a theory, but also 
defines a social technology that is used and modified by skilled social actors.   
The conception of social action I propose, focuses on the idea of social skill, defined as 
the ability to induce cooperation amongst others, including of course, the manipulation 
of the self interest of others. Skilled social actors empathetically relate to the situations 
of other people and in doing so, are able to provide those other people with reasons to 
cooperate (Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1959; 1974).  Skilled social actors must understand 
how the sets of actors in their group view their multiple conceptions of interest and 
identity and how those in other groups do as well. They must have a cognitive frame to 
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help aid in their interpretation of what is going on, that is built on these 
understandings.16  
The concept of social skill I use originates in symbolic interaction (Mead, 1934; 
Goffman, 1959; 1974; Joas, 1996). Actors' conceptions of themselves are highly shaped 
by their interactions with others. When interacting, actors try to create a positive sense 
of self by engaging in producing meaning for themselves and others. Identities refer to 
sets of meanings that actors have that define who they are and what they want. Actors in 
dominating positions, who are efficacious and successful may have high self esteem.17 
Actors in dominated positions may be stigmatized and are forced to engage in coping 
strategies to contest their stigmatization (Goffman, 1963). 
Skilled strategic actors engage in action because by producing meaning for others, they 
produce meaning for themselves. Their sense of efficacy comes, not from some narrow 
conception of self interest (although skilled actors tend to materially benefit from their 
skill), but from the act of inducing cooperation and helping others attain ends. They will 
do whatever it takes to induce cooperation and if certain actions fail, they will engage in 
other ones. This means that skilled social actors will tend to be both goalless and 
selfless whereas rational actors are by definition, selfish and have fixed ends.       
Social skill implies that some actors are better at attaining cooperation than others 
because some people will be better at making sense of a particular situation and produce 
shared meaning for others and bring about cooperation (Mead, 1934). All human beings 
have to be somewhat socially skilled in order to survive. The assertion is that some 
people are more capable at inducing cooperation and that in fields, those people can 
play important roles. Skilled social action requires orientation to members of one's one 
group and to the field. 
Social skill proves useful in creating political coalitions to produce institutions (i.e. 
acting as an institutional entrepreneur) or holding together disparate social groups 
within a given field under difficult conditions. Skilled actors use a number of tactics on 
both their own group members but also on other groups (for a review, see Fligstein, 
1997). They are adept at creating new cultural frames, using existing ones to gain 
cooperation, and finding ways to build political coalitions by finding compromises. 
There are a set of strategic skills involved in doing such things, such as agenda setting, 
brokering, taking what the system gives, and maintaining ambiguity. Skilled strategic 
actors engage in these tactics by manipulating social capital (networks), physical capital 
(resources), or cultural capital (symbolic claims). The motivation of actors with social 
                                                 
16 This point of view does not just turn the "other's" perspective into whatever one thinks it is (a "spin"), 
but is a serious attempt to empathetically make sense of what another thinks.   
17 Low self esteem might be associated with effective actors as well. People could be driven to action 
better in order to feel better about themselves and feel meaningful attachments to groups. But, if they 
have sufficiently low self esteem, they will interpret "success" as not providing evidence that they are 
worthy. This could bring them to continue to engage in aggressive "meaning" making projects, where 
they would always fail to find meaning and produce a positive identity for themselves. 
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skill is to provide their groups with benefits (Fligstein, 1997; Padgett and Ansell, 1994; 
Bourdieu, 1974; White, 1994; Coleman, 1993; Leifer, 1992; Nee and Ingram, 1997).  
This conception of social skill proves very useful in understanding the problem of how 
fields are constructed and reproduced. Skilled social actors tailor their actions 
depending on the current level of the organization of the field, their place in that field, 
and the current moves by other groups in the field. It is useful to consider how social 
skill is implicated in action in fields under different conditions.  
 New fields open up when groups see opportunities. The crisis of new fields reflects the 
fact that stable rules of interaction have not emerged and groups are threatened with 
extinction (Fligstein, 1996). Skilled social actors will orient their actions to stabilizing 
their group and their group's relation to other groups. It is here that inspired skilled 
actors, what DiMaggio (1987) calls institutional entrepreneurs, may come up with new 
cultural conceptions to invent "new" institutions. They may be able to form political 
coalitions around narrow versions of actors' collective interests to produce institutions, 
as game theory implies.  
It is also possible for new, unimaginable coalitions to emerge under new cultural 
frames.18  This process can appear to look like a social movement in that organizations' 
interests, identities, and preferences emerge out of interaction. Here, institutional 
entrepreneurs are able to engage many groups in a meaning making project that may 
bring stability to the field. 
 In settled fields, these same skilled social actors use the rules and the ambiguity of a 
given set of interactions, to either reproduce their privilege or try to contest their 
domination. Existing fields give incumbent actors a better chance of reproducing their 
advantage precisely because they imply an unequal distribution of rules and resources. 
If skilled strategic actors get attracted to positions of power in incumbent groups, their 
energy will be put towards playing the "game". Skilled social actors frame their moves 
vis a vis others with the end of enhancing or maintaining their group's position in the 
field.     
It is possible in stable fields that actors may not matter a lot for the reproduction of the 
field. After all, dominating groups have resources and rules on their side and the 
dominated have fewer opportunities. This is true in murky environments, where success 
and failure are difficult to evaluate (for instance, schools) and the legitimacy of 
dominant organizations may rarely be challenged (Meyer, Scott, and Deal, 1988).   
Fields can go into crisis as a result of changes that occur outside of fields, particularly in 
fields that a given field is dependent upon. Crises are frequently caused by the 
                                                 
18 All rational choice theories in economic and political science have resisted this idea so far. I think this 
reflects two concerns. First, it is difficult to see how the emergence of an entrepreneur can be predicted 
and if the point of theorizing is to make predictions, then entrepreneurs fall outside the context of theory. 
Second, game theory has relatively fixed parameters and it is difficult to imagine how one could develop 
a "game" where the whole point was that the game was transformed.   
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intentional or unintentional actions of governments or the invasion of a field by 
outsiders. Under these conditions, incumbents will attempt to enforce the status quo. 
Challengers may join with invaders or be able to find allies in government to help 
reconstitute a given field. The social fluidity of this situation suggests that new bargains 
are possible. But they are most likely to be undertaken by challenger or invader groups 
because they are the ones who are not committed to the current order.   
 
TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF SOCIETY? 
Modernity is about the ability of people to become social actors. This means that the 
empowerment of people as actors has led to the explosive growth of fields. The 
production of fields opens up the opportunity to produce new fields by suggesting to 
skilled strategic actors where new benefits might be created. Institutional theory, by 
focusing on how actors and institutions work, opens up the link between fields, the 
production of new fields, and the state, and gives analysts tools with which to explore 
the dynamics and complexity of modernity. Institutional theories give rise to the view 
that society contains countless fields, millions of local orders, some of which are 
oriented to each other and most of which are not. It is useful to trace out some of the 
obvious implications of this view for understanding the relation between fields, and 
between fields and states.  
Governments can be viewed as sets of organizations that form fields constituted by the 
claim to make the rules (i.e. the institutions) for everyone else in a given geographic 
area. Since states are the arenas where the rules about who can be an actor and what 
they can do are made, all organized groups naturally turn to government. The making 
and enforcement of general rules has a huge effect on the existing constitution of fields 
and the possibility for new fields outside of the government. Challenger groups orient 
themselves to states precisely to change rules that prevent them from being constituted 
as actors in fields either in the state or outside of it. 
"Normal" politics is often about entrenched groups using political systems to maintain 
their dominance of fields. Extra-legal or social movement politics is about trying to 
open new policy fields and creating new organizational capacity for governments to 
intervene for one set of groups or another. Social movement groups can try and invade 
established political fields and change the rules which are written against them. Their 
ability to succeed is a function of a crisis or political opportunity, being organized, and 
having a collective identity by which disparate groups can coalesce (Tarrow, 1994).  
One can index the capabilities of a government by a reading of its laws, the current 
organization of its politics, and the construction of its fields, i.e. its organizational 
capacity to intervene into the fields of society. The possibility for the capture of policy 
fields or the production of new policy fields depends on the current resources and rules, 
and the opportunities presented to skilled actors by crises.  
The theory of fields implies that one would never want to separate social movement 
politics from "normal" politics. The difference between them is that social movement 
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politics are trying to establish a new policy field or transform an existing one, while in 
normal politics, incumbents are defending their privileges.19 Thus, studying social 
movements ("politics by alternative means"), makes sense only if one recognizes that 
the alternative means are focused on creating a new field or transforming an existing 
one. 
This view of the state and society opens up the terrain of the dynamism of modern life. 
Incumbent actors in fields and their connection to political fields tend to reproduce 
themselves and try and disorganize challengers. But, incumbent actors face crisis either 
from states, induced by dependence on another field, or by invaders from nearby fields.  
New institutional projects are always occurring in and across societies. Skilled social 
actors armed with cultural frames borrowed from one field can try and create a new 
field. Openings can be provided by the intentional or unintentional actions of 
governments. Socially skilled actors might migrate from their current field if they 
perceive opportunities to exploit. This means that at any given moment, fields are being 
formed, in crisis, and being transformed.  
The problem of the relation between fields, and between fields and the state is one of 
the great theoretical frontiers of institutional theory. The major issue is that fields are 
dependent upon one another (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977). Because of this dependency, 
a crisis in some field is likely to set off crises on other fields. As crises spread, pressure 
will be brought to bear on governments to intervene, usually on the side of incumbents. 
The problem is that sometimes the spread of these crises  follows explicable lines. But 
frequently, crises are induced as an unintended consequence of crisis in other fields. 




It is utopian to believe that the encounters between the new institutionalisms will 
eventually yield a common consensus about definitions, mechanisms, or the goals of 
such a theory (Nee and Ingram, 1997 seems more optimistic on this point). New 
institutional theory applied to the field of scholarship implies that scholars have a huge 
stake in their own research agendas, their disciplinary biases (i.e. their cultural frames), 
and the organizational basis of their fields (Bourdieu, 1984). In essence, as scholars, we 
live in fields (of scholarship) and those fields constrain and enable us. At the end of the 
day, we all have to be able to say that our cognitive frames are the best ones (I, of 
course, include myself in this). 
                                                 
19 Social movement politics can be oriented towards destruction of the whole system. This means a 
transformation in all of the fields of the state and the rest of society. For such a transformation to be 
possible, it follows that a large number of fields would have to be in crisis. Such a crisis would require a 
societal wide disaster such as war or depression.   
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But there is something to be gained in the encounter between disciplines and subfields. 
By observing the strengths and weaknesses of different perspectives, one can see more 
starkly how one's view is useful and limited, as well. Occasionally, one can see that 
there are ways to bring views of processes together in a deeper way, a way that will 
encourage research, and get scholars to at least see the virtue in one another's point of 
view. New institutional theory suggests that one cannot expect that these new insights 
will infiltrate the core of any scholarly field, precisely because the reproduction of that 
field depends on enforcing the dominant conception of the field. If fields succumb to 
other fields (i.e. sociology yields to economics, for instance), they risk colonization and 
absorption.  
This exercise reassures me that sociology has a lot to add to these discussions, 
something that economics and political science will have great difficulty doing. I 
believe that all institutional theories need a theory of fields based on the differential 
power of organized actors and their use of cultural tools, and the sociological version is 
the most compelling.  
All institutional theories need a theory of action as well. Rational choice and game 
theory have produced a stylized model that is attractive and intuitive. I have sketched 
out what I think part of a sociological alternative is. But this answer remains 
undeveloped in this context (see Joas, 1996, for a general argument about the 
importance of the interactionist model). This means there is a lot of work to be done. 
In sociology, there has been another reaction to both rational choice theory and more 
traditional structuralist approaches, one that has been called "a turn towards the 
cultural", or more radically, "social constructivist". This is usually intended to suggest 
that all social interaction requires culture and context to make sense. This is often 
intended as an argument against both structural and rational accounts. But, as I have 
tried to show, all new institutional theories, including rational choice, view institutions 
as social and cultural constructs and emphasize context. Indeed, the central agreement 
of all of the new institutionalisms is the need for both a theory of local structure and 
action.  
Modernity has produced the conditions under which actors can fight back under crisis 
conditions and produce redefinitions of fields. But it has also meant the production of 
effective social technologies to stabilize fields and prevent challengers from doing so. A 
theory that ignores either will have little luck explaining the dynamism of modernity 
and the unique twists and turns it has taken.         
My more panoramic vision of a theory of society built from a theory of institutions is 
even sketchier than the theory of fields and action. To move this theory along, will 
require deeper delving into the links between the important organized institutions of 
modernity, the state, organized politics, social movements, and the economy. The 
theory of action and fields is a set of evolving practices, a set of myths, and part and 
parcel of organized social life as we live and experience it every day. We are still at an 
early stage in discovering it and its effects. 
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